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Abstract 
Opium is at the heart of the war economy in Afghanistan, involving a broad range of 
actors. It generates a sustainable violence cycle and, while international troops 
withdraw from the country, threatens the Afghan government’s reconstruction 
efforts. The European Union (EU) plays an important part in the debate on how to 
deal with this issue. Several counter-narcotics policies have been implemented since 
2001 and have mostly failed. This paper looks at these failures and questions the 
European Union’s ability to help tackle the problem of opium in Afghanistan. It 
argues that a comprehensive development response, backed by counter-narcotics 
incentives, could unfasten the spiral of the war economy. It also argues that the EU 
has developed relevant policies based on poverty alleviation and a structural 
approach to the opium issue but still lacks the means for action and for donor 
coordination in order to significantly influence the situation. 
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Introduction 
In 2013, opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan reached the highest level ever 
recorded: twelve years of counter-narcotics policies led by Western countries could 
not stop the expansion of poppy farming. The European Commission has disbursed 
US $2.8 billion over the period 2002-20111 in order to honour its commitment to a 
“prosperous and democratic Afghanistan”, 2  while the potential export value of 
opiates at the Afghan border, estimated by the United Nations, stretched to US $3.0 
billion in 2013 alone.3 2014 is a critical year for the country, with international troops 
withdrawing and a new round of elections being held. Dealing with the heavy-
weight opium economy will be a key factor in defining the direction taken by a 
country that is slowly rebuilding but could swiftly fall back into civil war. 
The culture of drug crops in Afghanistan can be conceptualised as a rational 
cost-benefit calculation conducted by various agents maximising their profits. This 
paper queries the extent to which the European Union (EU) can help influence these 
calculations and tackle the problem of opium in Afghanistan. 
As all actors involved in the country, the European Union confronts a dynamic 
system of economic incentives for violence based on drug crops. Unlike most other 
actors though, the EU aims to mainstream counter-narcotics in its actions in the 
country. By exploring the idea of drug crops shaping economic and political 
structures in Afghanistan, this paper argues that a comprehensive, poverty-oriented 
approach integrating security and development policies is necessary to succeed in 
a comprehensive counter-narcotics approach and in the stabilisation of the country. 
It also argues that the EU’s general strategies and specific policies represent a strong 
basis for action in the country, making it a particularly relevant partner for 
Afghanistan. Yet, the EU still lacks the necessary means for further action and for 
coordinating donors.  
Analysing the opium issue and understanding how to influence the related 
cost-benefit calculations entails three steps: first, the notions of war economy and 
structural approach are defined; second, these notions are applied to poppy 
economics in order to identify actors’ interests and interactions; and third, the 
                                                 
1 Government of Afghanistan, Ministry of Finance, Development Cooperation Report 2012, 
Kabul, 2012, p. 48. 
2 EU-Afghanistan Joint Declaration, Committing to a New EU-Afghan Partnership, Strasbourg, 
16 November 2005, p. 1. 
3 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) & Government of Afghanistan, Ministry 
of Counter Narcotics, Afghan Opium Survey 2013, Kabul and Vienna, December 2013, p. 72. 
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positive and negative incentives implied by several counter-narcotics policies are 
compared in relation to local interests and interactions. This analysis of past policy 
attempts shows that a comprehensive, poverty-reduction oriented approach is 
necessary to impede the opium economy. The strategies developed by the relevant 
institutions of the EU are then scrutinised in order to see what elements of such a 
comprehensive poverty-reduction approach they include. Finally, actions of the EU 
in Afghanistan are studied in order to assess their role and impact. 
 
Conceptual framework 
This section defines the major concepts that will be referred to throughout the paper 
as well as the methodology used, combining economic reasoning and the analysis 
of policies. 
Definition of concepts 
Unlike the ‘break-down’ models of conflict, which assume that wars are chaotic and 
irrational, the notion of war economy looks at the financial interactions of actors who 
maximise profits in a war situation. The literature of war studies shows that some form 
of rational organisation often emerges within the conflict, with non-state actors for 
instance providing state-like services such as security for trade.4 A new economic 
system builds up, especially in conflicts involving natural resources or the production 
of drugs.5 
The concept of structural foreign policy refers to a policy aiming to influence 
the political and socio-economic structures under which states operate. It is 
characterised by its long-term focus, the attention paid to sustainability and the 
interrelatedness of dimensions and levels. 6  A structural approach to an issue 
consequently implies its inclusion in a broad contextual analysis and in a long-term 
action plan that targets underlying political and socio-economic structures. 
Coordination efforts and the use of a large array of instruments are the two central 
points of this policy concept. Diplomacy and trade agreements, but also 
                                                 
4  D. Keen, “The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars”, Adelphi Paper, no. 320, 
London, 1998. 
5  For a proposed differentiation between war economy, ‘black’ economy and coping 
economy in Afghanistan, see M. Bhatia & J. Goodhand, “Profits and Poverty: Aid, Livelihoods 
and Conflict in Afghanistan”, HPG Background Paper, London, February 2003, pp. 6-9. 
6  S. Keukeleire, “EU Structural Foreign Policy and Structural Conflict Prevention”, in V. 
Kronenberger & J. Wouters (eds.), The European Union and Conflict Prevention, Policy and 
Legal Aspects, The Hague, TMC Asser Press, 2004, pp. 153-154. 
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development cooperation are tools of structural foreign policies. European policies 
ranging from the European Security Strategy7 to the Communication on Conflict 
Prevention8 include elements of structural foreign policy. 
The interdependence of all elements of development is increasingly 
acknowledged as a key to efficiency and sustainability. Although sometimes 
frustrating because it does not provide quick results, the ‘comprehensive 
development’ approach has proved valuable to avoid backlashes, relapses and 
counter-productive assistance.9 It was first developed by the World Bank and has 
been largely integrated in European policies like ‘The European Consensus on 
Development’.10 The ‘comprehensive development’ approach takes into account 
the interdependence of governance, human, social, economic, financial, and 
environmental dimensions when planning development cooperation. In the case of 
Afghanistan, for instance, rural micro-finance, rural development, local capacity-
building, decentralised state-building, securitisation and the return of refugees are 
overlapping development challenges that all are elements of a comprehensive 
development approach. 
An increasing number of development cooperation actors stress the need for 
coordination among governments, donors, civil society and the private sector as well 
as harmonisation of donors’ priorities and procedures. They promote local ownership, 
with the receiving country being the principal coordinator of their ‘comprehensive 
development’ strategies. These ‘coordination’, ‘harmonisation’ and ‘ownership’ 
goals are defined in ‘The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness’,11 which aims to 
mainstream the concept of ‘principled development’. 
                                                 
7 European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy, Brussels, 
12 December 2003. 
8 European Commission, Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention, COM 
(2001) 211 final, Brussels, 11 April 2001. 
9 N. Hanna & R. Agarwala, “Toward a Comprehensive Development Strategy”, OED Working 
Paper Series, no. 16, Washington D.C., The World Bank, 2000, pp. 9-10. 
10  European Parliament, Council of the European Union, European Commission, “Joint 
statement on European Union Development Policy: ‘The European Consensus’”, Official 
Journal of the European Union, C46, 24 February 2006. 
11  OECD, The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action, 
Paris/Accra, 2005/2008, followed by Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, Busan 
Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, Busan, 2011. 
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Methodology 
In 1980, Louis Dupree described statistics on Afghanistan as “wild guesses based on 
inadequate data”.12 In 2003, Jonathan Goodhand showed that the centralised and 
weak Afghan state was not able to give a reliable picture of the rural economy: 
because of taxation and conscription, data related to land and those related to 
family members were blurred by a “mud curtain”.13 Over three decades of conflict 
have made this problem worse. Regarding the opium economy, its illicit nature 
creates problems for documentation.14 The figures used in this case study should 
consequently not be read as authoritative, but they are reliable enough for the 
purpose of the analysis. 
To analyse the opium issue and the EU’s role in this field, this study combines 
data on the volumes and economic impact of opium production (mostly from the 
UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey and the World Bank Data Catalogue15) with an 
analysis on political and economic structures, drawing on the academic literature. 
This framework is used to assess the counter-narcotics policies and explain their 
results. EU policy documents are analysed and interviews are used to gauge the 
coherence of the EU’s approach. The concrete outcomes and the impact of EU 
policies are appraised using policy assessments and third actors’ reports.  
The following section applies the concepts of war economy and structural 
approach to poppy economics in Afghanistan in order to identify actors’ interests 
and interactions. 
 
Opium and sustainable violence: an analysis of poppy economics as a 
system of rational cost-benefit calculations 
The role of the opium economy in Afghanistan does not 
represent a new trend. In many ways, history reinvents itself.16 
 
The opium issue is central in both the political structures and the economy of 
Afghanistan. Even after the dramatic drought of 2008, the opiate economy 
                                                 
12 L. Dupree, Afghanistan, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1980, cited in J. Goodhand, 
Frontiers and Wars: a Study of the Opium Economy in Afghanistan, draft, SOAS, University of 
London, January 2003, retrieved January 2014, http://www.necsi.edu/afghanistan/pdf_data/ 
SeminarJG29012003.pdf 
13 J. Goodhand, Frontiers and Wars, op.cit., p. 2. 
14 Ibid. 
15 World Bank, Data Catalog, retrieved March 2014, http://datacatalog.worldbank.org. 
16 P.A. Chouvy, “Afghanistan’s Opium Production in Perspective”, China and Eurasia Forum 
Quarterly, vol. 4, no. 1, 2006, p. 21. 
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represented one third of the total legal economy.17 In the Southern provinces, where 
cultivation of opium poppy18 and cannabis19 is concentrated, the drug sector is the 
main industry.  
Opium poppy cultivation in the Afghan region became massive and turned 
into a state monopoly under the reign of Akbar (1556 to 1605).20 The Afghan land 
was recognised as the most suitable for this crop by an Empire that stretched from 
the Bengal to Kabul. The contemporary opium issue arose in 1979, when the Soviet 
Union invaded the country and systematically bombed its agricultural fields. Irrigation 
systems were destroyed and farming land surface significantly reduced. 
Subsequently, farmers were pushed towards the production of poppy due to its high 
value. By 1989 Afghanistan produced 14% of the world’s opium. 21 The synergies 
between the drugs and domestic conflicts continued to grow after the Soviet 
withdrawal in 1989 and the subsequent reduction of aid flows from the US and Saudi 
Arabia. In a state of constant civil war, Afghanistan became the largest producer of 
illicit opium in 1991 with 1,980 metric tons per year. 22  Fights between factions, 
including the Taliban, caused the emergence of a war economy in which opium 
production financed weapons. Open conflict generated a rise in poverty, which in 
turn pushed more farmers towards opium production. 
Moral issues play a role in farmers’ decisions to grow poppies, since opium is 
often considered haram (that is, against Islamic law). Nonetheless, the behaviour of 
the actors involved in the war economy can be analysed as rational economic 
calculation. Traffickers offer credit facilities to farmers: they buy the future harvest 
during the sowing season at a price below market value. This system, called the 
salaam, is particularly relevant for returning refugees and indebted farmers. The 
salaam also provides control and profits to local strongmen. It defines spheres of 
influence, and in some places opium is the only crop that can grow without 
                                                 
17 UNODC, Addiction, Crime and Insurgency. The Transnational Threat of Afghan Opium, 
Vienna, 2009, see graph p. 95. The UNODC’s results (Afghanistan Opium Survey 2013, op.cit.) 
show that this share fell to 15% in 2013 but it is likely to increase if GDP contracts because of 
international troop withdrawal. 
18 UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2013, op.cit., p. 10.  
19 UNODC & Government of Afghanistan, Afghanistan Cannabis Survey 2012, Kabul and 
Vienna, September 2013, p. 9.  
20 A.-F. Ibn Mubarak, Akbar’s vizier, Ain-i-Akbari, Fatehpur Sikri, around 1590. This record of the 
administration states that opium was cultivated in the Empire during this period. 
21 United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), Statistics and Analysis on 
Supply of and Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Vienna, 1996, p. 8. 
22 Ibid. 
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irrigation. It is therefore not only an illegal crop but an entire political and economic 
sub-system.23 
 
Counter-narcotics, from eradication to local governance pacts  
Opium had long ceased to found its empire on spells of 
pleasure; it was solely by the tortures connected with the 
attempt to abjure it, that it kept its hold.24 
 
There have been numerous attempts to reduce opium production and trafficking in 
Afghanistan through a variety of methods. This section looks at several of these 
methods and draws a picture of the lessons learnt. 
Eradication: supply-reduction by force 
Eradication is a priori the most straightforward method to curve drug production. Yet, 
manual eradication or eradication through aerial spraying of herbicides destroys 
Afghan farmers’ livelihood. It increased poverty in rural areas and had a negative 
impact on the image of the actors carrying out the eradiction: the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Government of Afghanistan. Richard Holbrooke, 
US envoy for Afghanistan, calls eradication “the single most ineffective program in 
the history of American foreign policy. […] It actually strengthens the Taliban and al-
Qaeda, as well as criminal elements within Afghanistan”.25 In the absence of credit 
facilities after eradication, a lot of impoverished farmers planted poppy again using 
traffickers’ loans.  
‘Money for not planting’, another supply reduction method, has been tested 
by the British diplomats and troops in the Helmand province. They paid Afghan 
farmers not to farm. Some of the farmers used the money to expand and irrigate 
poppy fields in more remote locations.26 Some others, who agreed not to plant, 
finally did not receive money due to a budget shortage. In this way, the entire 
                                                 
23 For an analysis of the macroeconomic impact of opium (value added distribution, GDP, 
balance of trade and balance of payment) see J.B. Veron, “L’Economie de l’Opium en 
Afghanistan et ses Implications en termes de Développement”, Afrique Contemporaine, no. 
215, Paris, Agence Française de Développement, March 2005.  
24 T. De Quincey, “Confessions of an English Opium-Eater”, London Magazine, September-
October 1821, p. 69 of Dover’s 1995 republication. 
25 R. Holbrooke, “Still Wrong in Afghanistan”, The Washington Post, 23 January 2008. 
26 J. Nathan, “The Folly of Afghan Opium Eradication”, USA Today Magazine, March 2009. 
Benjamin Thibaut Denis 
10 
experiment lost credibility and was not conducted again.27 These projects failed due 
to a lack of alternative livelihood and to a lack of control in farming activities. They 
show that Afghanistan and European policies in Afghanistan cannot rely solely on 
coercive supply reduction policies, which could result in the emergence of areas 
controlled by drug cartels and paramilitary groups, thus contradicting state-building 
efforts. 
Substitution programmes: alternative crops and alternative markets  
In an attempt to limit revenue losses caused by eradication, crop substitution 
programmes (saffron, cotton, etc.) were launched between 1989 and 1996. They 
were implemented by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with a ‘poppy 
clause’: abandoning poppy cultivation was a pre-requisite for aid. The assessment 
made by the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) shows 
that this conditionality created distrust and wariness in the relations between farmers 
and NGOs.28 David Mansfield points out that the reasons for poppy cultivation were 
not taken into account.29 Access to credit and access to markets, for instance, were 
ignored, and revenue levels were hardly matched. If these programmes contributed 
to reconstruction and rehabilitation, they did not lead to the emergence of long-
lasting economic sectors and were not an efficient answer to the drug economy. 
In October 2007, the European Parliament rallied for the idea of pilot projects 
of licensing poppy cultivation for the pharmaceutical industry.30 Here the scheme 
was not a crop substitution but a market substitution. Creating an official system 
controlled by – and benefiting – the state, this proposal aimed to break the vicious 
circle of the drug economy. 31  In an interview, the former Director of the Senlis 
Council Afghanistan confirms that in 2005, Habibullah Qaderi, then Afghanistan's 
Minister for Counter-narcotics, actually wanted the country to become a legal 
                                                 
27 “Afghan farmers sue over poppy crops UK lawsuit could affect co-operation with troops”, 
The Herald, 10 April 2006, cited in T. Mužík & A. Bartoli, Narcotics, Organized Crime and 
Security in Eurasia, News Digest 17.04.06, retrieved April 2010, http://www.silkroadstudies.org/ 
new/inside/publications/NewsDigest%203-10%20April.pdf  
28 The Afghanistan Drug Control and Rural Rehabilitation Programme was UNDCP’s initial 
supply reduction initiative. See D. Mansfield, Alternative Development in Afghanistan: The 
Failure of Quid Pro Quo, Feldafing, August 2001, p. 3. 
29 Ibid. 
30 European Parliament, Recommendation to the Council of 25 October 2007 on Production 
of Opium for Medical Purposes in Afghanistan, (2007/2125(INI)), retrieved December 2008, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P6-TA-
2007-0485  
31 F. Grare, “Anatomy of a Fallacy: The Senlis Council and Narcotics in Afghanistan”, Carnegie 
Working Paper, no. 34, Waterloo, Ontario, February 2008, p. 7. 
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producer. 32  Yet, there are difficulties implementing such a programme. Indeed, 
Article 23 of the 1961 UN Convention lays down conditions to become a legal 
producer that would have been hard to meet given the poor security situation in the 
poppy-producing provinces of Afghanistan. 33  If such a programme was to be 
implemented, its success would depend on the development of infrastructures, 
markets, sufficient revenue from legal opium and a higher level of law enforcement.  
Jean-Luc Lemahieu declares that “[b]etween yesterday’s opium income and 
tomorrow’s legal income, today requires an increase in quality of life for the farmer 
and his family”. 34  Given the structural nature of the drug issue, a mere supply-
reduction approach is doomed to fail and the prioritisation of poverty reduction 
objectives is the only framework that efficiently tackles the multifaceted economic 
calculation of Afghanistan’s rural population. 
Principled development and the ‘comprehensive approach’ on narcotic drugs  
In an interview a European Commission official admitted that “doing only crop 
substitution was a mistake. It has been done by everyone including the European 
Commission in Nangarhar. National rural development programmes with local 
ownership are now the main focus of our support. It empowers the government”.35 
This illustrates two of the lessons learnt from past experiments: development 
programmes must be ‘comprehensive’ and they must be ‘principled’.  
‘Comprehensive’ development programmes are promoted by European 
policies like ‘The European Consensus on Development’ in order to overcome the 
shortcomings of alternative crop projects.36 Rural development programmes cover 
alternative livelihood issues from seeds to transport and marketing infrastructure. 
Such cross-cutting programmes also seek to coordinate the return of refugees, rural 
micro-finance and decentralised state-building. Their final objective, which is also the 
main accountability criteria for all parties, is poverty alleviation. 
                                                 
32 Interview with a former director of the Senlis Council in Afghanistan, 20 April 2010. The 
interviewee adds that “the project was swiftly blocked by the American and British 
counsellors that held most power within the Ministry”. 
33 United Nations, “Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs”, Treaty Series, vol. 976, no. 14152, 
1961. 
34 J.L. Lemahieu, UNODC Representative in Afghanistan, quoted in R. Nordland & T. Shah, “US 
Turns a Blind Eye to Opium in Afghan Town”, The New York Times, 20 March 2010, retrieved 
April 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/21/world/asia/21marja.html 
35 Interview with Paul Turner, DG Relex (now EEAS), European Commission, Brussels, 2 February 
2010. This view is personal and does not represent the opinion of the European Commission. 
36  European Parliament, Council of the European Union, European Commission, “Joint 
Statement on European Union Development Policy: ‘The European Consensus’ ”, op.cit. 
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‘Principled’ development cooperation sticks to local initiatives (‘ownership’ 
and ‘leadership’)37 and promotes cooperation among donors (‘coordination’38). The 
need for local leadership has been verified the hard way in Afghanistan. 39 The 
government’s leadership of development policies was arguably too weak, the 
Parliament and citizens were not involved enough in shaping those policies and 
donors were too often using their own implementing partners instead of the 
government’s systems to deliver aid. As a consequence, development projects were 
not seen as local initiatives: the author’s own field work conducted in October and 
November 2006 in Kandahar and Lashkar Gah provinces demonstrated that 
development projects were often perceived as NATO projects, leading to a 
detoriation of their security situation. 
Building comprehensive, principled poverty-reduction policies is one of the 
greatest challenges faced by Afghanistan and donors like the EU today. These 
policies must recognise the opium issue as a key to development and as such 
integrate counter-narcotics goals. Development assistance generates both 
incentives and disincentives through facilitation, subsidies and conditionality (see 
Figure 1 below). Eradication and interdiction are risks imposed on poppy farmers. 
These methods all contribute to the following ‘tool box’, adapted from Peter Uvin’s 
four categories of tools available to the international community to influence 
decisions in recipient countries: 40 
                                                 
37 OECD, The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, Accra Agenda for Action and Busan 
Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, op.cit. 
38 Ibid. 
39  “I believe the aspirations and demands of the people of Afghanistan today can be 
summarised in four simple words: Afghan leadership, Afghan ownership.” H. Karzai, opening 
remarks, London Conference on Afghanistan, 28 January 2010. 
40 For Peter Uvin’s four categories of incentives and disincentives in terms of human rights, see 
P. Uvin, The Influence of Aid in Situations of Violent Conflict, A synthesis and a commentary on 
the lessons learned from case studies on the limits and scope for the use of development 
assistance incentives and disincentives for influencing conflict situations, Informal Task Force 
on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, Paris, OECD DAC, 1999, p. 3. 
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Fig. 1: Incentives and disincentives in terms of illicit crop cultivation 
 Non-conditional Conditional 
Incentives Subsidising seeds and ensuring 
market access for legal crop 
Financing reconstruction if the 
community abandons poppy 
farming (the ‘poppy clause’)  
Disincentives Interdicting and eradicating 
Threatening to reduce financial 
and public service provision in 
opium cultivating villages 
Source: author’s own compilation. 
Georg Frerks, writing on peace conditionality, recalls that “due to the limited volume 
of aid relative to incomes from natural resources, the fact that donors’ development 
activities per se are limited or absent in conflict areas, and that conditionality does 
not affect rebel groups very much”, these categories generate limited change in 
actors’ behaviour.41 In order to maximise incentives, the coordination of eradication, 
interdiction and comprehensive rural development programmes is required. 
According to European Commission officials, none of them should be conducted 
alone, and there appears to be a consensus on that point in the international 
community.42   
Nevertheless, the comprehensive approach endorsed by the EU faces an 
increased risk of inconsistency. Firstly, eradication and interdiction can contradict 
poverty reduction policies. Secondly, helping the farmers in breach of the law with 
alternative crops may create incentives for others to break the law and plant poppy. 
For that reason the counter-narcotics goal should not take over poverty alleviation. 
Thirdly, development projects aim for structural progress even though the security 
situation has not yet settled from a crisis level to an ‘unstable peace’, where conflict 
resolution and post-conflict peace building are usually considered possible.43 This 
extra challenge means Afghanistan and its donors must match rural development 
with capacity building for the national police and army. 
 
                                                 
41  G. Frerks, The Use of Peace Conditionalities in Conﬂict and Post-conﬂict Settings: A 
Conceptual Framework and a Checklist, The Hague, Clingendael Institute, 2006, p. 31. 
42 Interview with P. Turner, op.cit. The views expressed in this interview are personal. 
43 Interview with R. Kalantary, USG in Relief & Operation, Afghan Red Crescent Society, 
Kandahar, 12 November 2006. This view is personal and does not represent the opinion of the 
ARCS. 
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EU policy: a structural approach to the opium issue? 
The EU’s primary goal in development cooperation is, according to Articles 21 TEU 
and 208 TFEU44, the eradication of poverty. This must also be the focus of all strategies 
in Afghanistan. Furthermore, positively influencing the Afghan war economy entails 
taking into account the intertwined nature of development and security on opium 
issues, and coping with the local complexities of aid efficiency.  
This part starts by examining how the EU approaches ‘new’ security threats 
and how the destabilisation of Afghanistan fits into its analysis. Then the EU’s country-
specific policies are assessed by using the two following criteria: their relevance to 
the opium issue and their integration of aid effectiveness principles like ‘ownership’ 
and ‘alignment’. Finally, its ability to develop as a platform for ‘harmonisation’ – 
another aid efficiency principle – and to diminish the fragmentation of aid in 
Afghanistan is examined. 
The EU and new security threats 
The European Security Strategy develops the ambition of sharing “the responsibility 
for global security”. 45  It thus justifies the fact that European “forces have been 
deployed abroad to places as distant as Afghanistan”.46 Amongst the five most 
serious threats facing contemporary Europe, the strategy lists terrorism, state failure 
and organised crime. In light of these security priorities, Afghanistan appears to be a 
model case for EU action.47 In listing these priorities, this short document uses the 
word “link” five times, so as to underline their interconnection and complexity. The 
European Security Strategy depicts the EU as “particularly well equipped to respond 
to such multi-faceted situations”.48 
100 tons of heroin are consumed every year in the EU, generating criminality 
and profits for organised crime.49 The EU has set out its vision in two policy papers, the 
                                                 
44 European Union, “Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union of 13 December 2007”, Official Journal of the 
European Union, C115, 9 May 2008. 
45 European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy, Brussels, 
12 December 2003, p. 1. 
46 Ibid. 
47 E. Gross, “Europe's Growing Engagement in Afghanistan: What Success for ESDP?”, CFSP 
Forum, vol. 5, no. 4, July 2003, pp. 12-13. 
48 European Council, European Security Strategy, op.cit., p. 7. 
49  European Commission, Impact Assessment, Commission Staff Working Document 
Accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on an EU Action Plan on Drugs (2009-2012), SEC(2008) 2455, Brussels, 18 September 
2008, p. 15. 
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latest versions of which are the ‘EU Drugs Strategy 2013-2020’50 and the ‘EU Action 
Plan on Drugs 2013-2016’.51 The EU defines its strategy as a “balanced, integrated 
and evidence-based approach to the drugs phenomenon”. 52  It articulates a 
coherent policy framework touching upon supply, demand and trafficking. The 
important place development cooperation is given in the EU drug policy is typical of 
a comprehensive approach and is relevant to the Afghan opium issue. However, 
“[t]he priorities of EU drug policy are not well translated into external funding 
programmes and projects in third countries”. 53 The European Commission’s Impact 
Assessment called on European development actors to “[e]nsure the integration of 
projects in the drugs field into the co-operation and assistance programmes with 
third countries/regions. This should cover demand and supply reduction, as well as 
alternative development in producer and transit countries”.54   
“Security is a precondition of development” says the European Security 
Strategy.55 In the European Consensus on Development, state fragility is described as 
not being an inherent characteristic but rather a dynamic process.56 Consequently, 
in fragile states, the EU focuses on prevention. In the Commission Communication 
‘Towards an EU Response to Situations of Fragility’ two elements are underlined: the 
role of early warning and the contribution of Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) in giving 
impetus to assistance programmes to address the root causes of conflict and the risks 
of vulnerability as well as to include conflict sensitive approaches. 57  This link is 
characteristic of a structural foreign policy towards fragility which acknowledges the 
mutually reinforcing nature of poverty and state failure. In summarising the debate 
on fragility, the European Centre for Development Policy Management concluded 
that “most lessons learned point to the crucial importance of state-building […] 
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under local ownership”. 58 The EU’s policy focus on prevention and assistance in 
situations of state fragility is suitable in that regard.  
The EU Afghan policy papers: counter-narcotics and aid effectiveness 
The European Commission describes its country-specific development policies in 
CSPs which draw on the Commission’s own budget. The Country Strategy Paper 
2007-2013 for Afghanistan is meant to target its support at three focal areas: rural 
development, governance and health. 59  By mainstreaming counter-narcotics in 
these areas, it addresses the different aspects of the problem. The CSP states that 
“the guiding principles for EC assistance will be to utilise Government structures 
wherever this is feasible in implementing programmes and to provide continued 
support to existing national programmes”. 60  This approach to alignment, which 
echoes the Paris Declaration’s principle, initially encountered difficulties given the 
weak capacity of the Government of Afghanistan. 61 In addition, the CSP, drafted in 
2005, explains that the European strategy was to focus on the Nangarhar province, in 
an attempt to achieve greater impact. In the following years, experiences of 
alternative livelihood proved to be of little effect if not integrated in a broader and 
participative rural development scheme. 
The EU Action Plan published by the Council in its Conclusions of October 
200962 is much less oriented towards poverty reduction.63 By stating that “insecurity in 
Afghanistan cannot be addressed by military means alone”,64 the Action Plan insists 
on the importance of improved state-building, governance and the rule of law. On 
the one hand, the counter-narcotics strategy is placed in the rule of law chapter 
rather than in the rural development one and shows a focus on trafficking. On the 
other hand, the Council is not directly involved in development cooperation 
programming, and this explains its emphasis on actions like the EU police mission 
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(EUPOL). The Conclusions express the common view of European states that “rural 
development remains one of the key entry points in improving livelihoods, 
eradicating poverty and stimulating economic recovery but also in building local 
level governance”. 65  “[T]he Comprehensive Agriculture and Rural Development 
Facility should receive EU support” along with “rural micro-credit schemes”.66 The 
Council, in its Conclusions of June 2013, draws on the ‘alignment’ and ‘managing for 
results’ principles, by calling for  
the development of a new strategy in place of the 2009 Action Plan that is 
aligned with the strategic thinking of the Government of Afghanistan, identifies 
deliverable objectives and timelines, and sets out a clear division of labour. The 
strategy should be ready for endorsement by mid-2014.67  
Thus, the EU’s country-specific policy papers are relevant to the structural issue of 
opium and increasingly integrate aid efficiency principles. 
The need for harmonisation 
The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness commits the signatory donors to the 
‘harmonisation’ of their actions, by reducing the fragmentation of aid programmes, 
procedures and priorities. 68  This is particularly relevant for Afghanistan, where 
experience shows that aid, coming from a very large number of donors, has to be 
principled in order to help tackle the problem of opium.69 The EU has a role to play in 
coordination at the European level and is committed to help “the Governments of 
Afghanistan and Pakistan in their leadership role in improving co-ordination, 
especially of aid”.70 These two dimensions of coordination find echoes in the EU 
funding of the UN and of the Afghan National Development Strategy, as well as in 
the mandate of the European Union Special Representatives (EUSRs) and in the 
European Consensus on Development. 
The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is in charge of 
leading the international civilian effort and of assisting the Government of 
Afghanistan in its task of coordinating aid. In this context, the European priority is 
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“[s]trengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act 
effectively”. 71  This body is meant to contribute to the execution of the Afghan 
National Development Strategy, which is the main document for external 
coordination. The Afghan National Development Strategy has been drafted by the 
Government of Afghanistan in order to set the priorities and overall guidelines for 
development in the country. Its preparation “has been the biggest policymaking 
and strategy development event in the history of modern Afghanistan”, and 
constitutes a step towards ownership.72 The EU is committed to the implementation of 
the Afghan National Development Strategy and should be soon channelling 50% of 
its aid through its structure and budget support. 
To help in the difficult task of coordinating aid in Afghanistan, the EU decided 
to mandate a ‘double-hatted’ Special Representative, in charge of the first 
harmonisation at the European level. Vygaudas Usackas took office in April 2010 and 
was followed by Franz-Michael Mellbin in September 2013. The EUSR is both Head of 
the EU Delegation in Kabul and representative of the Council. Thus, the Special 
Representative is in a position to ensure consistency between the policies of the 
different institutions and to represent the Union. The Council Decision states that the 
EUSR “shall promote overall Union political coordination [and] ensure that all Union 
instruments in the field are engaged coherently”.73 It does not directly mention the 
coordination of Member States’ policies, preferring the words “shall [work] in close 
co-operation with EU Member States’ representatives in Afghanistan”. 74  Such a 
European-level harmonisation proves difficult in the field of counter-narcotics, where 
Germany, for instance, advocates a demand-reduction policy based on harm 
reduction, while the UK has for long been closer to the US’s position and a policy 
based on interdiction and supply reduction. 
The EU perceives the drug problem as a new, multifaceted security threat. Its 
different policy papers show a balanced approach, based on development 
assistance. They increasingly integrate the principles of aid efficiency. Translating 
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these principles into effective ownership and harmonisation is one of the greatest 
challenges faced by the European Union in Afghanistan.  
The EU ‘cooperative power’ capacity: a role in tackling the opium issue? 
On the international scene, the EU is characterised by the low degree of coercion 
which it uses in order to exert influence. As a ‘cooperative power’, it relies largely on 
civilian means and negotiation. Its focus on shared interests led the EU to adopt the 
notion of ‘partnership’, with development cooperation and ‘soft power’ as its main 
tools. This paper argues that a comprehensive, poverty-oriented approach is 
necessary to succeed in counter-narcotics. After over ten years of European 
cooperation with the Government of Afghanistan, the extent to which the EU has 
contributed to the promotion of principled, comprehensive poverty alleviation 
policies can be assessed.    
Results assessment of development aid and Trust Funds  
Commentators like to emphasise the complementarity of NATO and the European 
Commission, the latter being considered a specialist of civilian means and Official 
Development Assistance (ODA). The ‘Donor Financial Review’ and ‘Development 
Cooperation Reports’ prepared by the Afghan Ministry of Finance give a more 
detailed image of the European contribution.75 The European Commission ranks first 
in transparency and in submitting timely reporting on aid to the Government of 
Afghanistan. Between 2002 and 2011, the EU is recorded to have disbursed US $2.8 
billion in total.76 This figure should be analysed in comparison with the US $47.5 billion 
of the United States (general ODA, including Security Sector Reform) 77  and in 
comparison with other operations of international support.78 The EU is the third donor 
to Afghanistan after the US and Japan (second, if including bilateral ODA of its 
Member States). Its ratio of disbursement over commitment reaches over 90% and is 
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10 percentage points higher than the ratio of the US. The European Commission’s 
system of Multiannual Indicative Programmes (MIP) usually generates a good 
predictability of aid. As of 15 May 2014, however, the last Multiannual Indicative 
Programme for Afghanistan published is the MIP 2011-2013; the MIP for the following 
years is still unavailable on the EU’s websites.79 This can be explained by the EU 
starting a new multiannual financial framework in 2014, which implies a redistribution 
of budgets. It can also be explained by the potential difficulties of joint programming 
in a time of upcoming local elections. This difficulty in programming can finally be 
traced to the general uncertainty surrounding the future of Afghanistan, but it 
actually increases this very level of uncertainty. 
The European Commission has three main channels of delivery: implementing 
partners, civil society organisations and budget support (to the Government of 
Afghanistan or through multi-donor trust funds). Multi-donor trust funds (MDTF) are 
alternative aid instruments with some degree of local ‘ownership’: where state 
capacity is limited, they help in supporting the Government’s priorities. Thus, the 
application of principles and of the UN Reform initiative of ‘Delivering as One’ is 
facilitated, notably by reducing the costly fragmentation of aid. Some 30% of 
European Commission aid provided between 2002 and 2011 has been channelled 
through MDTF.80 In terms of budget support (essential for state-building) and local 
contracts (more beneficial for the country than international contracts), the 
European Commission is not particularly advanced.81 In Afghanistan, three major 
trust funds have been established: the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), 
the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) and the Counter Narcotics 
Trust Fund (CNTF), which was extended for the second time in 2010. These funds have 
been proven efficient in implementing the Afghan National Development Strategy. 
Nonetheless, the issue of donors increasingly pledging funds with ‘preferences’ has 
emerged. This is of particular concern for the ARTF, where the proportion of un-
preferenced pledges went down to 51% in 2008 and did not significantly progress 
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since then (58% in 2013).82 The Government of Afghanistan affirms that it is being 
deprived of its room for manoeuvre and is concerned about the fact that the 
predictability of funding is too low. 83  Consequently, it advocates multi-annual 
pledges.  
Building security with civilian means 
In the framework of its commitment to contribute to “a secure, stable […] and 
democratic Afghanistan”, the EU chose to focus on the police and the judiciary. 84 
With 40% of the European Commission’s aid budget for Afghanistan, the governance 
sector receives the biggest share of Commission funds.85 It works through the Law 
and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, for which the EU is the third largest contributor. 
The fund supports police force remuneration, pays for its equipment, supplies and 
facilities, as well as for some of its recruitment and training. LOTFA also supports the 
Central Prisons Department personnel and the introduction of a nationwide ID card 
system.86 Despite the significant success of the programme, which is exemplified by 
its achievements such as the construction of 628 police check posts, accountability 
and institutional capacity building in LOFTA’s projects still need to be improved.87  
EUPOL Afghanistan is the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 
mission mandated to participate in police training. Given the intergovernmental 
nature of the CSDP, both the EU and its Member States are referred to below. 
Launched in 2007 under the German presidency of the EU, the EUPOL mission was a 
solution for the German Police Project Office facing up the US pressure to improve 
police training while at the same time sharing the costs. However, this mission soon 
became a symbol of the EU’s inability to mobilise resources effectively. The 
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deployment of the mission was first delayed because security agreements with NATO 
were blocked by Turkey. Then the Head of Mission, to show his concern about the 
stalemate and the corruption in the Afghan National Police (ANP), resigned after five 
months in office. Between July 2010 and February 2014, EUPOL has provided training 
to 8,100 police staff and delivered 2,600 Afghan police trainer degrees. EUPOL has 
also established an Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office and funded the Police Staff 
College building for an overall budget of €210 million 88 (around €60 million per 
year).89 This represents an investment of €26,000 per person.90 In addition, the mission 
is of very limited size and has not managed to recruit the experts it needs. It is 
composed of 290 international staff and 200 local staff (as of February 2014), when its 
target is 400 international police trainers for the entire country. In this context, NATO 
Secretary General Rasmussen announced that NATO would also train the Afghan 
police from October 2009. Police training results are still not palpable, with its ranks 
described as “blotted by bribery, extortion, drug-running and defections to the 
Taliban”.91 
In many Member States of the EU, the selection of personnel for EUPOL is a 
prerogative of the regional government. In addition, “each mission consists of 
volunteers and requires ad hoc organisation of the logistic support and command”.92 
Jo Coelmont argues that it is necessary to consider building an in-house civilian 
‘battlegroup’, as these organisational issues of the EU are hampering its capacity to 
deliver.93 This is particularly worrying since “policing goes to the very heart of state-
building [and] is central to government legitimacy”. 94  EUPOL and the European 
contribution to the LOTFA are the main channels for the EU to contribute to the 
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Security Sector Reform and the ‘interdicting’ dimension of counter-narcotics (see 
Figure 1 above). Jamie Shea calls for the EU to stop training low level police and to 
make better use of its experts, for instance in agriculture.95 The Council of the EU, in its 
Conclusions of January 2014, affirms that it will continue to support civilian policing 
and justice beyond 2014 but that a strategic review of EUPOL Afghanistan is under 
discussion.96 
The most praised area of EU expertise is trade.97 The sheer size of its market 
and its experience of negotiating international trade agreements make the Union “a 
formidable power in trade”.98 Despite Afghanistan’s small trading volume and poor 
productive capacity, trade development has a major role to play in the stabilisation 
of the country, fostering growth and reducing the inflow of precursors needed to 
process opium. 
Trade for development and prospect for an EU trade policy towards Afghanistan 
Afghanistan’s past comparative advantages show that legitimate trade ought to 
play a central role in the country’s economic growth. “In 1978 Afghanistan was 
largely self-sufficient in food and was a significant exporter of agricultural products”, 
as well as of natural gas to the Soviet Union. 99 At the junction of trade routes 
between Central, South and West Asia, the Afghan economy historically relied on 
trade until flows were disturbed by the war in 1979. Today, the two main problems 
facing Afghan trade are problems of administration and investment. In fact, 
“administrative delays and informal payments can account for a majority of transit 
time and half of transit costs” of goods in Afghanistan.100 With diminished skills, poor 
organisation and weak processing capacity eroding comparative advantage, the 
Wold Bank reports major difficulties in revamping sectors that were profitable in the 
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past.101 In the 1960s and 1970s, Afghan raisins, for instance, “were an important 
export by international standards, with good markets especially in India and other 
regional countries”.102 “However, production approaches are now outdated, yields 
are low, processing facilities have deteriorated, and packing and marketing are sub-
standard. In the meantime, other countries have filled the gap and Afghanistan has 
not just to revive but to catch up.”103 
The transit of goods purchased duty-free from Dubai and smuggled into 
Pakistan provides one of the major sources of income for local warlords. Such 
trafficking weakens the Government of Afghanistan’s attempts to build a monopoly 
of force and deprives it from customs revenue. “Black or grey markets are a strong 
incentive for both government employees and regional strongmen to maintain weak 
states” 104, which also holds true for the opium market. The country primarily needs to 
build up its customs and administrative services to control trade. The work which the 
EU leads on customs facilities in Torkham, Sher-Khan Bandar (Tajikistan border) or 
Heiratan (Uzbekistan border) may thus exert an important leverage on stability and in 
breaking the war economy spiral. 
Afghanistan benefits from the EU’s ‘Everything But Arms’ unilateral trade 
initiative. 105  However, the Union’s presence is still not felt much: the EU is 
Afghanistan’s third buyer, mainly of primary and leather craft products, with less than 
10% of Afghan exports. 106 The Afghan economy has historically been largely focused 
on trade with its neighbours. Regional trade integration can consequently contribute 
to the long-term economic development of the country and the EU can contribute 
by providing assistance to customs administration and by supporting Afghanistan’s 
endeavour to join the World Trade Organization.  
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Tackling the opium issue through regional cooperation 
Any reference to regional cooperation in Southwest Asia, landlocked between 
Central and South Asia, and surrounded by long-standing antagonisms, “is apt to 
raise a weary smile”.107 It has, however, been argued that the “long-term stability of 
Afghanistan is mainly contingent upon its integration in a regional co-operative 
framework”.108 For the EU, the promotion of regional integration is part of a strategy 
to ‘export’ its model. In Afghanistan, the impact of its support has been moderate 
and its actions still seem rather driven by short to medium-term perspectives.109 The 
EU has, however, increasingly supported UNODC’s rainbow project, a regional forum 
linked to counter-narcotics that could have a long-term impact. Depending on the 
issue discussed, the forum involves different countries and tends to show a low level 
of integration, with each regional cooperation structure dedicated to a single policy. 
If evolving towards broader and greater coordination, these programmes could help 
the EU promote regional integration. As the UNODC’s first contributor (12.3% of its 
budget), the EU exerts influence on these regional programmes.110  
During her hearing at the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, 
Catherine Ashton declared that the EU needs to “provide concrete results about 
what we do to the citizens of Afghanistan”.111 “What we do”, that is supporting the 
Government of Afghanistan in building up capacity and in fostering development, 
has produced mixed results. For the EU to influence economic calculations and help 
tackle the problem of opium in Afghanistan, its ‘cooperative power’ capacity is 
arguably relevant but still shows shortcomings. The Union has already contributed to 
progress of governance, notably in customs affairs. Its Official Development 
Assistance is delivered in a principled way but is of a moderate size if not added 
(and coordinated) with Member States’ ODA. It has taken a significant role in trade 
and regional cooperation, but outcome is still minimal in these areas. Finally, in the 
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field of Security Sector Reform, the EU was unable to live up to the challenge. Where 
the European Commission has direct authority to act, programmes are launched. It 
can to a certain extent mobilise funds and allocate them in a principled manner, but 
it does not always have sufficient field structures and personnel to ensure optimal 
implementation on its own.  
Conclusions: drawing lessons from the past 
Opium is arguably a core ingredient of the conflict in Afghanistan: it ensures its 
sustainability. The production of opium has been at the heart of a war economy for 
several decades and in a variety of political settings. Any peace-building and state-
building attempt has to integrate a comprehensive strategy to transform this war 
economy. The emerging state and peace have to be as gainful as the war 
economy to numerous stakeholders in order to be accepted and in order to persist. 
This paper set out to understand the extent to which the European Union can help 
tackle the problem of opium in Afghanistan. Exploring the idea of drug crops shaping 
economic and political structures in Afghanistan, it showed that a comprehensive, 
poverty-oriented approach is necessary to initiate a sustainable change in 
behaviour and to succeed in counter-narcotics policies. The EU’s general strategies 
and specific policies represent a strong basis for such actions, making it a particularly 
relevant partner for Afghanistan. 
However, the methods used until now have not been able to tackle poppy 
production. The negative incentives of criminalisation and eradication proved 
insufficient and often counter-productive. When coupled with the positive incentives 
of cash-for-work and alternative crops programmes, counter-narcotics are often 
seen as too weak or lacking local ownership to significantly succeed. The experience 
of these failures tends to demonstrate that in order to produce substantial results, 
programmes designed to tackle the issue of opium cultivation must be 
comprehensive (massive and cross-cutting) and take into account the principles of 
aid effectiveness. The opium issue is central in the Afghan security-development 
nexus, and it takes a broad policy pursuing a poverty-reduction objective to 
untangle its complexities. The analysis shows that the EU’s structural approach takes 
these past failures into account.  
For now, the EU’s influence has been limited. European-level harmonisation 
proves difficult in the field of counter-narcotics. Its aid to Afghanistan is significant but 
smaller than aid from Japan if not including EU Member States’ bilateral assistance. 
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The EU’s contribution to police training is hampered by organisational issues and the 
European market represents less than 10% of Afghan exports. Regional cooperation is 
key to fight opium and foster development. The EU is in essence a coordinator, 
taking governments beyond the mere addition of their wills and actions. It has a 
crucial role to play in fostering regional partnerships, in the harmonisation of 
international development aid efforts and in ensuring that the momentum for a 
comprehensive poverty-reduction approach does not vanish. After 2014, the 
international community is likely to turn away from Afghanistan, which actually needs 
increased attention from development agencies. This would not be new: after 
Russian forces withdrew from the country in 1989 and after the regime of President 
Mohammad Najibullah fell in 1992, “[t]he United States and its allies lost interest in 
Afghanistan and did little to help rebuild the war-ravaged country”. 112  Yet, if 
Afghanistan counts for the EU’s security, turning a blind eye to opium should be 
carefully avoided. 
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